Bureaucrats in parliament: theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany by Brändle, Thomas & Stutzer, Alois
W I R T S C H A F T S W I S S E N S C H A F T L I C H E S  Z E N T R U M  ( W W Z )  D E R  U N I V E R S I T Ä T  B A S E L  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 2008 
 
 
 
 
Bureaucrats in Parliament: 
Theory and Evidence on Its Determinants in Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WWZ Discussionpaper  07/08            Thomas Braendle and Alois Stutzer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W W Z  |  P E T E R S G R A B E N  5 1  |  C H  –  4 0 0 3  B A S E L  |  W W W . W W Z . U N I B A S . C H  
 
The authors: 
 
Thomas Braendle 
Department of Economics (WWZ), University of Basel 
Petersgraben 51 
CH - 4051 Basel 
 
thomas.braendle@unibas.ch      
 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Alois Stutzer 
Department of Economics (WWZ), University of Basel 
Petersgraben 51 
CH - 4051 Basel 
 
alois.stutzer@unibas.ch 
      
      
      
      
      
 
 
 
      
      
      
      
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A publication of the Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), University of Basel. 
© WWZ Forum 2008 and the author(s). Reproduction for other purposes than the personal use needs 
the permission of the author(s). 
Contact: 
WWZ Forum | Petersgraben 51 | CH-4003 Basel | forum-wwz@unibas.ch | www.wwz.unibas.ch 
Bureaucrats in Parliament:
Theory and Evidence on Its Determinants in Germany∗
Thomas Braendle† and Alois Stutzer‡
September 29, 2008
Abstract
This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public administration and the leg-
islature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns
that the strong representation of bureaucrats in many Western parliaments compromises the
constitutionally proposed political neutrality of the public service and generates a conflict
of interest. We present a cost-benefit calculus and analyze specific legal provisions for the
German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. Based on
a novel data set, we find that incompatibility rules decrease and abeyance compensation
increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments.
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I. Introduction
In order to restrict the abuse of sovereign authority, government functions are assigned to dif-
ferent bodies in a democracy (precept of the separation of powers). Though broadly applied
in principle, the concrete personal separation is set differently based on specific institutions in
every democracy. A major constitutional decision concerns the degree of compatibility of an
employment in the public service and a mandate in the legislature. In the United States and in
the United Kingdom there holds ineligibility; i.e., public servants have to withdraw from office
even before they accept a candidacy and have no legal claim to reemployment in the former
position after the mandate. In contrast, in countries like Austria and Germany there are weak
and strong forms of incompatibility, but no ruling of ineligibility exists. In fact, a large propor-
tion of parliamentarians in these countries is from the public service.1 In 2007, 55.2% of the
members of the first parliamentary chamber in Austria (Nationalrat) were public servants. The
respective figure in Germany (Bundestag) was 40.2%.2
The strong representation of bureaucrats in parliaments has raised public concern but has not
yet sparked much scientific research.3 The existence of personal union and affiliations or the
perk of guaranteed reemployment compromise the constitutionally proposed political neutrality
of the public service and generate a conflict of interests. This is due to these parliamentarians’
double role as agents in public service and as principals that supervise the public service in par-
liament. It might be hypothesized that, as a consequence, the public service enjoys substantial
discretion, which prejudices the efficient execution of public services. There is, however, also
a contrary rationale emphasizing that public servants present a reservoir of highly skilled and
motivated people who benefit the system in drawing on their specialist knowledge in legislation
and monitoring. A strong representation of public servants might then be expected to increase
government performance. Independent of these two opposing arguments, it might be argued
that the electorate has chosen these representatives in the first place. However, citizens can
only choose among fellow citizens who are willing to run for a parliamentary seat and who are
supported by a major political party.4 In order to understand who is selected into parliament,
1 Professionals from the public sector typically represented come from professions in education
(i.e., teachers or university professors), members of the armed forces, police officials, magistrates,
ministers, political public servants, (senior-)officials in various fields of public administration,
mayors and district administrators (Landra¨te).
2 Information on the fraction of public servants in the national parliaments is from the
parliamentary service (www.parlinkom.gv.at) for Austria and from Kintz (2006) for Germany.
3 The issue was taken up in two popular books in Germany (von Arnim 1991, Scheuch and
Scheuch 1992). In contrast, a few public choice academics only commented on the phenomenon
(e.g., Tullock 1965, Frey and Pommerehne 1982).
4 Citizens’ choice might be further restricted if electoral rules prescribe closed lists in pro-
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we need to take a step back and study such aspects as the incentives that motivate individuals
to opt for a candidacy.
In this paper, we analyze the way in which specific legal provisions offer public servants incentives
to pursue a candidacy for a parliamentary mandate and quantify to what extent these affect
their representation in the legislature.5 This is a first step towards better understanding a
phenomenon, termed pejoratively in German “Verbeamtung der Parlamente” (i.e., parliaments
becoming dominated by people with civil service status). However, the phenomenon is evident
in other advanced democracies as well (see Best and Cotta 2000, chapter 13). We develop
a general political-economic framework and complement it with specific institutional details
for Germany and its Laender (as the federal states are called). The theoretical focus is on
issues of incompatibility and a wide set of related institutions that determine the cost-benefit
calculus of running for a seat in parliament (supply side). In particular, we investigate how,
for example, the compensation for holding office in abeyance during parliamentary membership
and subsequent automatic promotion affect the attractiveness of a political mandate. Moreover,
we look at how aspects like local and temporal availability and specific political human capital
favor or adversely affect the chances public servants face in the race for a seat compared to other
professional groups. A set of empirically testable hypotheses is derived. The theoretical analysis
is expanded with a short discussion on the role of public servants as voters (demand side).
Based on a novel data set, some of the theoretically analyzed determinants are empirically tested.
For all the German states, we compiled data on the fraction of public servants in parliament and
on the legal restrictions and privileges applied to public servants over the last 60 years. As main
results, we find that the granting of compensation for holding office in abeyance is statistically
related to a larger fraction of public servants in parliament; whereas, the application of a strict
as well as a soft incompatibility rule, signifying higher opportunity costs, are correlated with a
smaller fraction of public servants in parliament.
We see our work as a contribution to comparative institutional analysis dealing with a specific
issue of political selection. It links with several strands of literature in political science, political
economics on selection and markets for politicians (e.g., Besley 2004, 2005, Chattopadhyay and
Duflo 2004, Eichenberger 2003, Mansbridge 2008, Serna 1995), disclosure rules for politicians
(e.g., van Aaken and Voigt 2008) and political recruitment and elite research (e.g., Best and
Cotta 2000, Norris 1997, Patzelt 1999). Closest to our study in the German context is the careful
portional representation.
5 Abstracting from differences in the legal status, the terms bureaucrat, public servant and
employee in the public service (Beamter or Angestellter im o¨ffentlichen Dienst) will be used
interchangeably. Within the German institutional context, the rules of civil service law are
similar to those bearing on a large segment of employees in public service. Differences will be
mentioned if it is important for the outlined arguments.
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work by the political scientists Klatt (1976, 1980) and Schrode (1977), who discuss the potential
causes and consequences of the representation of public servants in parliaments. However, they
do not provide a systematic account of the determinants in one cohesive framework and do not
offer an empirical test on representation.
Section II presents the theoretical framework capturing institutional incentives in the selection of
bureaucrats as candidates for political mandates. The role of public servants as voters is briefly
discussed in Section III. The empirical analysis is presented in Section IV. A detailed descrip-
tion of the compiled database is followed by an econometric analysis of the partial correlations
between institutional factors and the fraction of public servants in German Laender parliaments
(Landtage). Section V offers concluding remarks, emphasizing the (potential) consequences of a
high representation of bureaucrats in parliament.
II. Bureaucrats as Candidates
The conditions under which public servants are allowed to sit in the legislature and their situation
once they are in it shape incentives to run for a seat and are reflected in the fraction of public
servants in parliament. We briefly mention the basic trade-off between the separation of powers
and political representation that is relevant in the decision on ineligibility and incompatibility of
a position in the public service with a parliamentary mandate. A general illustration is provided
by the national parliaments in Germany and Austria (subsection A). Pursuing a rational choice
perspective, a detailed benefit and cost calculus is discussed based on the specific institutional
details in the German Laender (subsection B).
A. Ineligibility and incompatibility of public service with a parliamentary mandate
Institutions governing the personal separation of powers in a democracy affect the basic trade-off
between issues of agency and selection. Stricter personnel separation not only reduces agency
problems arising from the intrapersonal conflict of interests but also limits the pool from which
competent and honest people can be selected for a specific mandate. The more public servants
are barred from taking up parliamentary mandates, the more difficult it is for citizens to elect
candidates who have a high degree of expertise on issues of public administration and the
necessary information to effectively monitor the government and its subordinate public service.
The latter is important in order to attenuate the situation of asymmetric information between
the legislator and the bureaucracy as emphasized in the work by Niskanen (1971). Whether
public servants as legislators in fact care about the preferences of citizens and use their discretion
accordingly depends on their motivations and the kind of incentives that can be applied to hold
them accountable for their decisions.
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Here, we focus on the aspect of selection and have to leave open the overall consequences of
different institutional arrangements. We ask under which conditions public servants are more
likely to stand for office. It is hypothesized that the institutionally determined leeway enabling
the parallel pursuit of a career as public servant and as parliamentary member, along with
specific provisions on remuneration and other privileges awarded once in office, determine the
attractiveness for them to run for a seat in parliament.
(Intra-personal) interlinkages of interests and the attractiveness of a parliamentary mandate
are most curtailed when public servants are not eligible to stand for parliamentary election and
even have to resign before accepting a candidacy.6 Ex-public servants may still feel an obligation
towards public administration but their interlinkages are reduced to informal ties. Much weaker
restrictions constitute rules of incompatibility. With strict incompatibility, public servants have
to hold their office in abeyance but may remain in office until they are elected for a mandate; they
often have guaranteed reemployment subsequent to the termination of their mandate. With soft
incompatibility, only some categories of public servants are restricted, whereas all other public
servants can continue in their public service career, often with a guaranteed reduced work load.
Rules of incompatibility are institutionalized in Germany and Austria for example.
Incompatibility of public service with a parliamentary mandate in Germany
In 1949, the Parliamentary Council, entrusted with the formulation of the German constitution
(Grundgesetz (GG)), established Article 137, which authorized all levels of jurisdictions to im-
pose incompatibility rules on public servants. Following the pressure of the occupying powers,
the Parliamentary Council enacted an electoral law comprising strict incompatibility for the
first federal elections (only mayors and district administrators being exempted (i.e., kommunale
Wahlbeamte)). This law also included a guaranteed reemployment for all public servants running
for the federal parliament (not including mayors and district administrators). The strict rule of
incompatibility was absorbed in the first law on the legal status (Rechtsstellungsgesetz ) of the
members of the public service elected to the lower house of the German parliament (Bundestag)
in 1951 (BGBl. I p. 297), and a compensation for holding office in abeyance (Ruhegehalt) was
added in 1953 (BGBl. I p. 777). Since the law for the members of the federal parliament (Bun-
desabgeordnetengesetz ) entered into force in 1977, which extended the incompatibility to mayors
and district administrators but abolished the compensation for holding office in abeyance (see
6 This is the legal situation; e.g., in the United States in the congress or in the United
Kingdom in the lower house. An overview of candidacy requirements for legislative elections in
a set of countries is provided in Massicotte et al. (2004).
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subsection B), no major changes have taken place.7
The incompatibility of public service with a parliamentary mandate in Austria
The Austrian law on incompatibility (1983) includes few restrictions for members of the public
service willing to exercise an electoral mandate. Unless the responsible parliamentary commis-
sion rejects the compatibility in individual cases, most offices are compatible with a political
mandate. The main incompatible offices are magistrates, public prosecutors, judicial officers,
members of the armed forces and tax collectors. All of them have a right to reemployment.
Those holding a compatible office are entitled to a reduced work load and have to accept a
corresponding cut in pay (Bundesverfassungsgesetz Article 59 a).
The fraction of public servants in the German and the Austrian parliaments
Figure 1 illustrates the development of the fraction of public servants (on or off duty) elected to
the lower house of the German parliament (Bundestag) and the Austrian parliament (National-
rat). For Germany, an upward trend is observed for the representation of public servants until
the ninth legislative period (1981) from 26.1% up to 35.9%. The next three legislative periods
show little variation. In 1995, the fraction of public servants sets in above 40%, which is partly
due to a change in categorization (see the explanatory note in Figure 1).8 In comparison, the
fraction of public servants in the working population was 17.4% in 1970. It rose up to 19.4% in
1990 and declined to 13.3% in 2005 (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2005).
[Figure 1 about here]
In Austria, the strong representation of public servants is outstanding. In the first elected
parliament after World War II, more than half of the members of parliament were recruited
from the public service. The peak, with 61.7% was reached in 1971. Apart from the legislative
period 1996-1999 with 49.2%, always at least half of the members of parliament had a public
service background. An important reason for the high level of public service representation
might be seen in the far-reaching compatibility and the favorable terms of partial leave of
absence. Moreover, until 1983, the partial leave of absence did not cause a corresponding cut in
pay (Schmidt 1970: 191).
7 For a detailed description of the historical evolution of the incompatibility rule see Tsatsos
(1970) and Sturm (1967).
8 For a detailed discussion of the composition of the German federal parliaments starting
with the National Assembly of 1848 see Best (2007) and Weßels (1997).
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These observations for Germany and Austria on the representation of public servants in par-
liament can serve as prima facie evidence that legal provisions affect political selection from
specific groups of the electorate. A detailed analysis for the German Laender is presented in the
remainder of this paper.
B. The cost-benefit calculus of running for political office
The process of selecting public servants as legislators can be divided into at least three stages
that are linked by institutions and the strategic considerations of the agents involved.9 In a
first stage, the focus is on what motivates a public servant’s decision to run for office. In our
main analysis, we analyze the cost-benefit calculus of a public servant to predict his or her entry
decision. In the second stage, citizens decide on whom to vote for. We only touch upon this
aspect in section III. The third stage concerns elected politicians’ policy decisions, referred to in
the concluding remarks. The latter includes the discretion of a mandate and feeds back to the
attractiveness of a candidacy. A public servant is expected to run for office if this activity offers
the highest expected utility among his or her available alternatives. In order to avoid being too
abstract, we discuss the cost-benefit calculus regarding the specific legal provisions holding for
the German Laender.
Pecuniary compensation for the political mandate
The compensation of politicians is an important policy variable in an economic model of political
selection (e.g., Besley 2004) and gets particular attention in empirical research on the benefits
(and costs) of holding office (e.g., Di Tella and Fisman 2004). Depending on the specific institu-
tions, compensation here includes the income from the mandate, fringe benefits, the lump-sum
reimbursement of costs incurred in exercising the mandate (Aufwandspauschale) and the right
to a pension as the main material benefits. In the German context, and specifically for public
servants, there is an additional compensation for having to hold one’s office in abeyance while
sitting in parliament. These different forms of benefits will be discussed in turn.
Base compensation. For a member of a parliament in the German Laender the base compensation
is between 4,000 and 6,200 euros per month in 2007, whereby there is variation towards a lower
base compensation in city states. In addition, there are a number of fringe benefits that are
rather non-transparent in aggregate. Whether the package for legislators is attractive to public
servants, based on a simple compensation comparison, will depend on their individual position
in the salary and career scale, as well as their tenure. Political public servants in a ministry,
9 The three-step analysis follows the theoretical literature in the tradition of the so-called
citizen-candidate model (see Besley and Coate 1997, Osborne and Slivinski 1996).
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mayors in bigger cities or chief public servants in larger agencies earn more in public service than
they would from the scheduled compensation allocated to parliamentarians. This is different for
public servants in the middle and even some upper grades of the civil service, like administrative
officers, teachers, as well as mayors in smaller cities. The relative financial attractiveness of a
mandate holds all the more subsequent to the increase in parliamentary allowances (Dia¨ten)
following the decision of the German constitutional court in 1975 (BVerfGE 40, 296 [296]).
Privileges involving pension benefits, tenure, promotion and benefit offsetting. Many specific
provisions enacted for public servants sitting in Laender parliaments were based on the law
covering the legal status (Rechtsstellungsgesetz ) of the members of the public service elected to
the federal parliament. The latter was mainly derived from civil service salary law, civil service
career law, as well as public services law. While there is substantial variation in these provisions
across the Laender (that we exploit in our statistical analysis), we describe some of them here
to illustrate the issues involved.
First, when the Laender started introducing pensions for parliamentarians (around 1970), a
calculation of claims was chosen that was advantageous to them; i.e., the years (incompatible)
public servants spent in parliament were accounted twice.10 The years were taken into account
once in determining the pension entitlements from the mandate, and once again for the public
service pension scheme. In the latter case, pension claims were accumulated although no services
were rendered.
Second, the law in some Laender fully accounted the years during which a political mandate was
held for the tenure in public office (Besoldungsdienstalter), which is the most relevant factor for
determining a public servant’s basic salary.
Third, in Bavaria and Bremen for some years, incompatible public servants were automatically
promoted when they resumed their public service duties, as if they had been holding office in
an exemplary manner.
Fourth, it was prohibited to offset income (pay or pension) from a public office against the
parliamentary allowance or the parliamentary pension.
All four institutional provisions constitute particular benefits to public servants and render an
elective office in parliament more attractive. Employees in the private sector or representatives
of trade unions or professional associations may encounter similar conditions but they have no
10 The requirements for a parliamentarian to be entitled to an old-age pension are usually a
minimum age (between 55 and 65) as well as a minimum membership of 6 to 10 years. The
pension is, in most cases, at least 35% of the base allowance and increases for each additional
full year that a mandate is execised by around 3% of the allowance but to no more than 70% in
total (Braun et al. 2002: 207).
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legal claims, depend on the discretion of their superiors and may be bound to a direct equivalent
in terms of interest representation.
The German constitutional court in 1975 declared these four promotive provisions to be un-
constitutional and not in conformity with civil service law principles. The federal as well as
the Laender parliaments had to answer to this adjudication by reforming the legal status of
public servants elected to parliament. As a result, the years that public servants had spent in
parliament can no longer be taken into account in the civil service pension scheme, and the
provision of a automatic promotion has been suspended too. In all Laender now, only 50% of
the years spent in parliament are taken into account for the tenure in office, and parliamentary
allowances and old-age pensions above a certain amount have to be offset against income (salary
or pension) from the public office.
Abeyance compensation. A specific additional pecuniary benefit to public servants that increases
the attractiveness of a political mandate is the compensation for having to hold one’s office in
abeyance (Ruhegehalt). As mentioned above, based on article 137 GG, many public servants have
to leave their office vacant for the time they accept a mandate. Abeyance pay was introduced as
a compensation for this ban on holding office .11 Exceptions were the part-time parliament in
Hamburg and the senate in Berlin. Public servants in these parliaments are put on leave without
payments (Klatt 1976: 47-50). Abeyance compensation amounted to between 35% and 75%
of the allowable salary (ruhegehaltsfa¨hige Dienstbezu¨ge) and was automatically increased after
every legislative period (Dietrich 1976: 97). A further subtle, but financially attractive, benefit
for public servants (but not other employees of the public service) was the ongoing receipt of
abeyance compensation after the termination of the mandate until commencement of the old-age
pension. Public servants were able to resume their former office (or a comparable office in terms
of pay) upon their own request. However, the awarding of a decent abeyance compensation
created incentives to retire early. Following the decision of the German constitutional court
in 1975, public servants have to request reemployment within three to six months after the
termination of the mandate if they do not want to lose this claim. Furthermore, they generally
face stricter requirements with respect to the resumption of their public office (Braun et al.
2002).
In contrast, employees in the private sector have no legal claim to (partial) continuation of
payments when taking up a mandate. Moreover, they may experience a relatively higher depre-
ciation of their human capital than public servants. These disadvantages hold particularly for
professionals and self-employed people.
11 This was based on the law on the legal status of members of the public service elected to
the lower house of the German parliament of August 4, 1953 (BGBl. I p. 777).
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Finally, there is the possibility to go for a secondary income (e.g., honorariums from speeches,
employment by a foundation, mandate in an international organization or some supervisory
board, etc.). For public servants, this possibility is restricted when holding an office in public
administration but attractive when holding a mandate and put on leave; in particular, if the
mandate is not very time-consuming. According to data from the 11th and 12th legislative
period of the Landtag of North Rhine-Westphalia, roughly one fifth of public servants exercising
a mandate generated additional income outside the parliamentary arena (Holthoff-Pfo¨rtner 2000:
85).
In summary, we hypothesize that the mentioned specific privileges make a parliamentary man-
date more attractive and increase the fraction of public servants in the parliaments of the German
Laender.
Opportunity costs of a political mandate
Whether a mandate is attractive for a potential candidate depends not only on the compensation
but also on his or her opportunity costs; i.e., the lost income from an alternative occupational
engagement as well as the loss in disposable time. For public servants, a mandate involves lower
opportunity costs if it is legally compatible with their job in the administration. Independent of
the profession, there are lower opportunity costs of time with a part-time parliament. However,
as will be explained below, a parliament will differentially effect the attractiveness of a mandate
when studied in interaction with other institutions depending on whether it has a part- or
full-time organization.
A crucial but difficult issue is how a mandate depreciates or appreciates a person’s human and
social capital. For instance, one might query whether the opportunity costs of a mandate are
generally positively correlated with marketable professional skills in the private sector (Gagliar-
ducci et al. 2007). The advantages of gaining prominent status and contacts with a mandate
might well be more valuable to a highly-skilled, private-sector person both while in office and
even more so subsequent to it. In fact, Italian parliamentarians with a high previous income are
much less often present in parliamentary voting sessions than their professionally less successful
colleagues (Gagliarducci et al. 2007). Between sectors, a mandate might be relatively more
attractive for employees of the public service as their job-specific human capital is closer to
government activity and thus less likely to depreciate. Specific administrative knowledge as well
as familiarity with legal issues facilitate the meeting of legislatory requirements and decrease
the costs of holding a mandate.
Moreover, public servants might be more available (time, location) than employees in other
sectors or self-employed people (with the exception of professional politicians). In addition, at
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the local level mayors, district administrators, senior officials and teachers may be better known
to the public than other professionals. Both, greater availability and publicity reduce public
servants’ costs of campaigning.
Incompatibility. In the German Laender, there are three different arrangements defining the
compatibility between a position in public service and a political mandate: (i) compatibility, (ii)
soft incompatibility restricted to specific positions in the administration (or alternatively defined
in terms of specific compatible positions), and (iii) strict incompatibility involving employment
in the public sector in general. While strict incompatibility increases the opportunity costs for
all public servants, soft incompatibility increases them for only some public servants. Depending
on the Land, certain public servants (e.g., senior officials, magistrates, prosecutors and mayors)
as well as public servants employed on the same bureaucratic level as their parliamentary office
(i.e., public servants at the Laender level) are incompatible with a mandate in the Laender
parliament.
Full-time parliament. The organization of a parliament in being either a part- or full-time regime
will largely determine the work schedule and time commitments of a mandate and the amount
of time a parliamentarian has at his or her disposal. In the German Laender, there are full-
time parliaments except for Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (till 2011), Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg.12
However, the transition from a part-time to a full-time parliament is not officially defined.
We refer to specific legal provisions for identifying full-time parliaments. For many Laender,
the introduction of the law on the members of parliament (Abgeordnetengesetz ) following the
decision of the German constitutional court in 1975 can be considered as initiating full-time
parliamentarism. This law comprised often noticeably higher allowances, which were subject to
income taxation for the first time, higher reimbursements for costs incurred in exercising the
mandate, a right to an assistant, a disability-, health- and survivor insurance, as well as an end
of service equivalent. Considering public servants who have offices compatible with a mandate, a
part-time parliament involves lower opportunity costs because they are still able to partly fulfill
their job in the administration. However, this also holds for other candidates. It might even be
argued that a part-time parliament is particularly attractive to professional and self-employed
individuals because they can still carry on some business or maintain major client contacts. In
the situation where public servants are incompatible with a mandate, a full-time parliament
is more attractive than a part-time parliament because the former pays its members a higher
compensation for the mandate. Moreover, the status of the parliament also affects the extent to
which a mandate depreciates a person’s human and social capital. With a full-time parliament,
self-employed people and other professionals are at a disadvantage compared to incompatible
12 Due to centralization on the federal and European level, the main remaining competencies
of the German Laender are in the areas of education, police and administration.
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public servants who can spend more time on their parliamentary duties and on campaigning for
reelection.
Employment guarantee. Opportunity costs in terms of reduced employability after a mandate
are substantially reduced for public servants but not for candidates from other sectors. Public
servants have a legal claim on resuming their former office (or a comparable office in terms of pay)
after they resign from parliament or are not reelected. Other professions also enjoy dismissal
protection granted by the principle of the independent mandate and incorporated in article 2 of
the law on members of parliament. However, the dismissal protection holds only for one year
following the termination of a mandate and can be suspended, given there is some “serious”
reason (Braun et al. 2002: 60). The guaranteed and detailed legal right to reemployment for
public servants provides them with a long-term advantage which increases their institutionally
granted independence and reduces the risks associated with a political career.
Campaign leave. A peculiarity in earlier German civil service law was the entitlement of candi-
dates to up to two months leave for the purpose of preparing the election campaign (Wahlvor-
bereitungsurlaub), notably with full compensation. This privilege reduced the opportunity costs
of public servants when running for a seat, a project not easily juggled with a career. The
Laender (with the exception of Berlin) introduced this opportunity for paid leave based on the
German constitutional law (article 48 GG) and abolished it following the decision of the German
constitutional court in 1975.
In sum, we predict that soft and, even more so, strict incompatibility reduces the attractiveness
of a political mandate for public servants. However, if a parliament is operated as a full-
time organization rather than a part-time one, the effects of the incompatibility restrictions are
expected to be (at least partly) offset. This compensating effect is expected to be larger for strict
incompatibility than for soft incompatibility.13 Moreover, we expect that the reemployment
guarantee as well as the remunerated campaign leave increase the fraction of public servants in
parliament.
Discretion in a political mandate: rents and intrinsic benefits
Beside the direct material costs and benefits that determine the attractiveness of a political can-
didacy, there are important indirect or non-material benefits. They are in particular due to the
discretion of individual legislators in how they pursue their mandate. Awarding discretion to a
13 As argued above, in a regime where public servants are compatible, no unambiguous hypoth-
esis can be formulated with regard to the organization of the parliament as part- or full-time
and its relative attractiveness for public servants. In our sample of German Laender, we do
not observe the association of compatibility with a full-time parliament and can therefore not
empirically study the net effect.
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mandate is a precondition for a productive delegation of competence. Discretion also necessarily
emerges because the individual performance of legislators is only marginally observable. Here,
the question is whether a mandate offers more discretion to public servants and whether the
offered discretion is more attractive to public servants.
Owing to their experience in public administration, public servants are likely to have an infor-
mation advantage with regard to the content of policy issues as well as with regard to legislatory
procedures. As a consequence, they have more leeway to manoeuvre; in particular, in policy
areas they are professionally acquainted with, such as administration, security, public finances
or education. This increases the attractiveness of a mandate.
How public servants in parliament use their discretion is a separate issue. They can either pursue
their private interests as legislators awaiting reemployment in the public service, or they can
pursue what they perceive as public interest. The former behavior could be interpreted as a form
of rent extraction, while the latter could be seen as an intrinsically motivated service to society.14
In both dimensions, public servants might benefit more from the discretion than people from the
private sector. First, public servants in parliament might have more influence on the immediate
conditions they face - in particular, public service law (Beamtenrecht) - when returning to their
office than people from the private sector who have to lobby for general policies. Second, if public
service motivation is not only expected of public servants, but prevalent, i.e., there is already a
preselection of such people in the public service,15 the discretion of a political mandate becomes
more attractive to them.
Independent of whether candidates are intrinsically motivated or attracted by the rent-seeking
opportunities, parliamentary mandates are found to be particularly attractive to them. However,
a clear comparative analysis with (potential) candidates from the private sector is not feasible
given the available information. Moreover, we are not aware of institutional variation in the
discretion offered to public servants in the parliaments of the German Laender over time.
III. Bureaucrats as Voters
So far, we have mainly discussed the institutional provisions promoting the supply of public
servants as parliamentary candidates. In this section, we look at a complementary aspect in
outlining the demand for bureaucrats as legislators. We emphasize the role of bureaucrats as
14 We are aware that an intrinsic motivation to participate in the political process is not
equivalent to strong civic commitment or performance pledged to the public interest (see Frey
1997).
15 Public servants are more likely to donate money and blood to charities or to volunteer than
employees in the private sector (Houston 2006). Public sector employees are also more likely to
report having a preference for a job that is useful to society (Luechinger et al. 2008).
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voters, often organized in public trade unions, and analyse the attractiveness of public servants
as candidates for political parties.
The bureau voting model of government growth hypothesizes that public servants are more likely
to cast their votes in elections. This model assumes that public servants hold marked political
opinions and therefore favor candidates advocating higher government spending (Garand et al.
1991). The high turnout of public servants has been documented in several studies (see, e.g.,
Bush and Denzau 1977, Frey and Pommerehne 1982, Moe 2006). In their research, the higher
turnout rates for public servants compared to employees from other sectors are partly explained
by characteristics specific to them as a group: on-average higher levels of education; greater
union membership; and higher satisfaction and trust levels in the way democracy works. In
addition, greater interest in politics is identified, which might be ascribed to their occupational
interest as well as the lower costs they encounter when acquiring relevant information (Corey
and Garand 2002). Concerning policy preferences, it has been shown that teachers tend to vote
for more expenses on education (Frey and Pommerehne 1982) and public servants in general
tend to favor center-left parties (Garand et al. 1991).
Public sector unions not only mobilize bureaucrats as voters but also try to coordinate their
voting behavior in favor of candidates that implement union member interests (Moe 2006). As
no binding policy commitments are possible, public sector unions concentrate on their selection
of candidates. In this way, public servants are likely to support their policy interests, either
owing to professional identity or because they are personally positively affected by the union’s
preferred policies. This strategy is sustained when public servants vote for their peers, expecting
similar policy preferences.
Public servants are also attractive candidates for political parties in general. Parties need to
invest less in promoting the public image of candidates from the public service because of the
publicity related to their work or their office. While holding a political mandate, senior officials
and mayors may use public service facilities to execute their parliamentary duties. This allows
the party to reduce expenses by passing mandate-related work on to the public administration.
Given the time flexibility of public servants on (partial) leave while holding a mandate, parties
are more likely to recruit them for a political career that requires them to tread the mill of innu-
merable mandates (“Ochsentour”). In Germany, for example, public servants were also eligible
for up to two-months-paid leave in order to prepare the election campaign. This possibility was
abused by parties. They nominated public servants for unwinnable positions on the party lists
in order to get publicly subsidized election workers (Klatt 1980: 32). Given public servants’
right to reemployment, the party does not have to care about a public servant’s professional
future on resigning or not being reelected.
However, the institutional provisions or office-related advantages render the public servant
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elected to parliament relatively independent of party leaders and party obligations. As a re-
sult, parties have to trade the attractive characteristics of public servant candidates against the
lower bargaining power they have once they hold office.
IV. Empirical Analysis
A. Data
The empirical analysis is based on a newly compiled dataset for the fraction of public servants in
all the parliaments of the German Laender or city states as well as the specific legal provisions
defining the attractiveness of a political mandate for public servants. The longitudinal data
covers a period spanning between 62 years (Bavaria) and at least 14 years in the new German
Laender.
Composition of parliaments in the German Laender (Landtage)
There is some literature in political science studying the occupational composition of the German
Laender parliaments (see, e.g., Hess 1976, Holl 1989,and Handschell 2002). Mostly for single
election periods, statistics were published in the journal entitled Zeitschrift fu¨r Parlamentsfragen.
The main data sources are, however, the parliamentary handbooks (Volkshandbu¨cher), which
are published for every election period. They ideally contain information about the occupational
composition of the parliament or, otherwise at least, sufficient information about the occupations
held prior to entering parliament in short curricula vitae for the individual parliamentarians (an
example of an informative CV is shown in figure A.1 in the appendix). Based on the latter
information, we were able to code occupations and determine the professional composition (i.e.,
the fraction with a public service background). For example, the occupational composition
of the 15th Bavarian legislature (2003-08) indicates that 70 representatives or 38.8 percent of
the members of parliament were recruited from the public service. Out of these 70 members,
19 were employees of the public service and 51 had the status of public servants. They had
previously held the following functions: educational professions (40%), administration (32.8%),
judiciary (10%), municipal officials (10%), mayors (4.3%) and police and armed forces (2.9%).
The remaining representatives’ backgrounds were self-employment (i.e., lawyers, entrepreneurs
or farmers/cultivators) (41.1%), employment in the private sector or in professional associations
(15.5%), housekeeping (2.3%) and others (2.3%). A complete list of the data sources for the
dependent variable is provided in table A.1 in the appendix.
Overall, there is information about the fraction of public servants in parliament for 177 legislative
14
periods.16 There is no information for some early legislative periods due to data unavailability
and data incomparability (see the last paragraph of this subsection). On average, the fraction of
public servants in our sample is 39.6%, whereby it was lowest in Lower Saxony in 1947 (10.6%)
and highest in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg in 1988 (61.6%). The descriptive statistics for each of the
Laender are presented in table A.2 in the appendix.
Figure 2 presents the development of the fraction of public servants in parliament over time for
the three largest Laender, i.e. North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and Bavaria. The
fraction in all the three Laender increases until the mid-1970s. In Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and in
Bavaria, the fraction reached a level above 50%. While the level in North Rhine-Westphalia
was rather stable around 40% since the early-1980s, there is about a 10-percentage point decline
in Bavaria up to the mid-1990s and a second peak in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg around 1990. The
profiles for the remaining Laender are included in figures A.2 to A.4 in the appendix.
[Figure 2 about here]
In collecting and compiling the data on the fractions of public servants in parliament, we en-
countered several theoretical and methodological challenges. First, existing statistics on the
socio-economic composition of parliaments differ in their intended purpose. In contrast to our
study, which concentrates on the last occupation before being elected to parliament, some stud-
ies focus on educational background, the occupation learned (Handschell 2002), gender or race
(Norris 1997, Norris and Lovenduski 1995). As a consequence, the distinction between the last
occupation and the occupation learned often causes ambiguities. Second, for early legislative pe-
riods, occupational statistics either do not exist or are of poor quality because they are based on
voluntary self-disclosure. Moreover, the way categories were formed sometimes changes within
a time series causing structural breaks. As far as we observed such changes, we coded the
members of parliament in question on the basis of their entries in the parliamentary handbooks.
However, analyzing individual curricula vitae raises problems (mostly for early periods) in terms
of unclear chronologies of apportionments. For the current analysis, we restrict our sample to
legislative periods for which we were able to compile reliable data.
Institutional conditions for public servants as members of parliament
A series of different laws include provisions that define relevant claims of public servants who
either run for office or have a mandate. These are the law on the members of parliament
(Abgeordnetengesetz ) and its precursors (Gesetz u¨ber die Rechtsstellung der Abgeordneten or
16 Regular terms last either four or five years. Due to constructive votes of no confidence and
coalition instabilities, some legislative periods turned out shorter.
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Dia¨tengesetz ), the civil service law, the electoral law and the incompatibility law. For some
points of time, surveys for specific provisions in all the Laender were published in the journals
entitled Zeitschrift fu¨r Parlamentsfragen and Zeitschrift fu¨r Beamtenrecht, in the series Recht
und Organisation der Parlamente, and in a few law dissertations (Sturm 1967 and Tsatsos 1970).
We coded information for seven important institutional characteristics relevant for public ser-
vants.17 All the institutional variables are coded as dummy variables.
- Strict incompatibility: Strict incompatibility is given and coded 1 (0 otherwise) if all the
public servants have to hold their office in abeyance while in parliament. The reference
category captures compatibility; i.e., public servants elected to parliament do not face any
incompatibility restrictions.
Soft incompatibility: Soft incompatibility is given and coded 1 (0 otherwise) if only some
specific categories of public servants have to hold their office in abeyance while in parlia-
ment. The reference category is again compatibility.
- Full-time parliament: Laender parliaments are coded as either full-time parliaments (1)
or part-time parliaments (0). As there are no Laender that simultaneously had a full-
time parliament and compatibility, the correlation between full-time parliament and the
fraction of public servants in parliament cannot be calculated ceteris paribus. Instead,
we can only estimate the interaction effect in the two incompatibility regimes. Therefore,
two interaction terms (taking the value 1) are included: one for “strict incompatibility x
full-time parliament” and one for “soft incompatibility x full-time parliament”.
- Pension benefit: If for pension entitlements of public servants the years in parliament
are accounted twice (i.e., not only for the pension from the mandate but also for the
pension from the service in the administration), a pension benefit is given and coded 1 (0
otherwise).
- Abeyance compensation: If an extra compensation for holding one’s office in abeyance is
granted, the variable takes value 1 (0 otherwise).
- Automatic promotion: The variable takes value 1 (0 otherwise) if public servants are
automatically promoted when they reenter office.
17 There are, of course, additional factors that are relevant for the attractiveness of a mandate
such as its remuneration. However, these factors apply for all the candidates. A specific benefit
for public servants is their legal claim to reemployment after they resign from parliament. This
entitlement has not been changed since the Laender parliaments were constituted. Accordingly,
the effect of this factor on the relative attractiveness of a mandate for public servants cannot be
isolated in our statistical analysis.
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- Other privileges: This variable integrates four factors that grant preferential treatment
to public servants in parliament and that were abandoned following the decision of the
German constitutional court in 1975. These factors are: (i) guaranteed two-month paid
leave to prepare the election campaign, (ii) prohibition to offset income (pay or pension)
from a public office against the parliamentary allowance or the parliamentary pension, (iii)
right to continuation of payments of the compensation for holding office in abeyance after
resigning from the mandate and until entry into the old-age pension or until a reappoint-
ment was requested by the public servant or imposed by the public employer (employees
of the public service had no claim to this provision), and (iv) complete accounting of the
years with a mandate for the tenure in office. Only if three of these four factors apply,
substantial privileges are in place and the variable takes value 1 (0 otherwise).
Table A.3 in the appendix gives an overview of the institutional conditions holding in each state
over time, and table A.4 reports their relative frequency in the data set. Five parliaments intro-
duced a strong incompatibility ruling when they were constituted after the Second World War
(Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia) or after the German reunification (Saxony-Anhalt,
Brandenburg and Thuringia). Two Laender abolished compatibility and adopted strict incom-
patibility (Bavaria 1970 and Bremen 1967). Other Laender introduced a soft incompatibility
and replaced it by a strict incompatibility rule in the seventies (e.g. Saar, Rhineland-Palatinate
and Hesse). Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (until 2011), Berlin and Hamburg as well as the new Laender,
Saxony and Mecklenburg-Lower Pomerania, still know soft incompatibility for public servants.
Pension benefits due to double allowance for the years in parliament were granted for a relatively
short time in most Laender; i.e., mainly between the late-1960s and the late-1970s with the
exception of Hamburg and Berlin where this double allowance never applied. The compensation
for holding one’s office in abeyance was offered for some time in all the old Laender, except in
the city states Hamburg and Berlin. Bavaria was the last Land to introduce it in 1970 and also
one of the first to abandon it again in 1978 (together with Lower Saxony and Hesse). While the
federal constitutional court declared this provision to be unconstitutional, some Laender simply
labeled it differently and introduced an upper limit to it. Abeyance compensation (now called
compensation amount, Ausgleichsbetrag) is still offered in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and Bremen.
All the parliaments in the old German Laender started as part-time parliaments. In the mean-
time, only four part-time parliaments are left (Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, Bremen, Berlin and Ham-
burg). All the new German Laender started with full-time parliaments.
Automatic promotion only applied for a few legislative periods in Bavaria (1970-77) and Bremen
(1967-1978). The specific privileges that we integrate in one variable, and that were criticized in
the decision of the federal constitutional court in 1975, were introduced in almost all the Laender
between 1950 and 1963 (Bavaria 1970 and Bremen 1967 being the exceptions) and abandoned
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in revisions of the law between 1977 and 1980. For all institutional conditions studied in our
analysis, there is no variation in the New German Laender over time. Accordingly, we cannot
use observations for the fraction of public servants in these Laender parliaments to identify the
quantitative effect of the different legal provisions when we take Laender specific effects into
account at the same time.
Regarding the collection of the institutional variables, some challenges had to be met. First,
many provisions were laid down in the laws on the legal status of public servants elected to
parliament. However, other relevant provisions had to be found in the civil service law, the
electoral law or some other regulations. Second, in order to establish a chronological order of
the provisions in force (especially for the early periods), specific commission protocols, plenary
debate protocols and specific bills (law proposals and drafts) had to be studied. In the light of
the difficult political and institutional circumstances in the late 1940s and early 1950s in some
Laender, no corresponding provisions had been introduced.
B. Results
The empirical analysis focuses on the partial correlations from multiple regressions between
the institutional conditions for public servants as members of parliaments and their actual
representation in them. We report the results for a series of estimation specifications in order
to uncover as much information as possible about our data pool. Accordingly, the institutional
effects are identified under different assumptions about unobserved factors in our time-series
cross-section data.
The first set of results is based on the full sample, including observations from the old and the
new German Laender. Panel I in table 1 reports the results of a pooled OLS estimation. Partial
correlations for eight institutional variables are estimated. It is found that strict incompatibility
is related to a lower share of public servants in a part-time parliament (the reference regime being
“compatibility x part-time parliament”)18, while pension benefits, abeyance compensation and
automatic promotion are related with a higher share. The existence of a full-time parliament
offsets the negative effect of strict incompatibility on the representation of public servants. The
set of other privileges summarized in a separate variable is related to a lower fraction of public
servants in parliament, counter to our hypothesis. Together the factors account for 40.2% of the
18 As there are no observations for Laender that simultaneously assume compatibility and
maintain a full-time parliament, the pure effect of adopting a full-time parliament cannot be
estimated. Instead, the effect for full-time parliament is always conditional on having an incom-
patibility regime. Accordingly, the effects for the variables full-time parliament are formulated
as interaction terms. It follows that the coefficients for the two incompatibility variables (inter-
preted alone) hold for part-time parliaments.
18
variation in the dependent variable and the F-test indicates that the explanatory variables are
jointly statistically significant. With regard to the size of coefficients, e.g., in Laender and years
with strict incompatibility, on average, the fraction of public servants in part-time parliaments
is 13.4 percentage points lower than in part-time parliaments where a mandate is compatible
with a position in the public service ceteris paribus.
[Table 1 about here]
However, results from pooled estimations might be statistically biased due to omitted variables.
On the one hand, there might be socio-economic or institutional conditions in some Laender
that are not captured with our variables but that systematically affect the attractiveness of
political mandates for public servants (and are not orthogonal to our institutional variables).
On the other hand, there might be unmeasured time-specific effects on the representation of
public servants in the legislature that are correlated with some of the institutional variables.
A factor mentioned in our theoretical framework is bureaucrats as voters. As there exists no
comparable data on public sector employment over the time range of our study, this determinant
cannot be included directly. Instead, we take unobserved Laender- and time-specific variation
into account, including Laender-fixed effects (panel II), decade-fixed effects (panel III), or both
(panel IV) in our specifications.
The changes in the estimated partial correlations and the statistically significant Laender and
decade effects indicate that the effects of our institutional variables cannot easily be separated
from unobserved Laender characteristics and time effects.19 The partial correlations show that
strict incompatibility is related to a sizeably lower fraction of public servants in part-time par-
liaments (between -12.4 and -17.5 percentage points) independent of the inclusion of the fixed
effects. With Laender and/or time-fixed effects there is also a negative correlation (between -7.0
and -10.2 percentage points) for soft incompatibility. The negative effect of strict incompatibil-
ity is estimated to be systematically lower in Laender with a full-time parliament. A less clear
picture emerges for soft incompatibility in Laender with a full-time parliament. In specification
IV, no compensatory effect is measured.20 The variable capturing pension benefits has a small
positive effect (around 2 percentage points, not statistically significant) on the fraction of public
servants in parliament once time effects are taken into account. For abeyance compensation
a positive effect is estimated that is around 4 percentage points in specification IV with the
19 With regard to explanatory power, the inclusion of Laender-fixed effects alone shows an R2of
32.6%. In comparison, the R2 in panel II including the explanatory variables and Laender-fixed
effects is 45.6%.
20 The finding is in line with the theoretical reasoning in section B.2 that the compensa-
tion effect of a full-time parliament is smaller in a soft incompatibility regime than in a strict
incompatibility regime and that the net effect is inconclusive.
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complete set of fixed effects. The estimated effects of automatic promotion are also positive.
Whereby the inclusion of fixed effects reduces the effect size. The effect of the variable capturing
other privileges is negative, rather than positive as hypothesized, and amounts to -5 percentage
points in the fourth specification. Overall, the choice of specification matters for the size of the
estimated coefficients (but less so for the direction of the estimated correlations). Due to this
sensitivity, we explore the data with additional specifications.
In table 2, we concentrate on the independence of observations in our sample. This is done based
on the observations from the old German Laender, as with Laender-fixed effects: observations
from the new German Laender do not contribute to the identification of the effects of the insti-
tutional variables. Estimations in table 1 are based on the assumption that all the unexplained
parts of the fraction of public servants in parliament (i.e., the residuals) are independent across
space and time. However, there are many reasons why a positive residual for a specific legisla-
tive term is positively correlated with the residual of the next term. In particular, due to the
electoral advantage of incumbent members of parliament21, positive and negative “shocks” to
the fraction of public servants in parliament carry over to the subsequent terms. The average
length of stay in German parliaments is about two to two-and-a-half periods (see, e.g., Holl
1989 and Mielke and Reutter 2004). In fact, an inspection of the residuals shows significant
autocorrelation. We take this aspect of the political process into account including the lagged
dependent variable in our specification.22 As lagged dependent variables are often used instead
of time-fixed effects, we estimate one specification without decade effects (panel II) and one with
decade effects (panel III). In order to allow a comparison with a specification not including the
lagged dependent variable, panel I reports estimation results with Laender and time-fixed effects
for the old German Laender. For the specifications including the lagged dependent variable, we
calculate panel corrected standard errors taking into account panel heteroskedasticity. This is
recommended judging from the differential variation of the residuals across Laender.23
[Table 2 about here]
The following empirical findings emerge from these refined estimations. The past level of public
servants in parliament systematically and substantially affects the current level. According to
specification III, a 10-percentage point increase in the past legislative term is related to a 5.1
percentage points higher fraction in the current legislature. Strict incompatibility is related to a
21 For a theoretical account of the incumbency advantage see, e.g., Ferejohn (1977).
22 We follow Beck and Katz (1995) and give this specification priority over a time series
approach specifying an AR(1).
23 We started based on the assumption of homogeneity as our dependent variable is within
a range. However, an analysis of residuals across Laender indicates Laender-specific (or panel)
heteroskedasticity.
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substantially smaller fraction of public servants in Laender with a part-time parliament, an effect
that is robust across specifications in tables 1 and 2. It seems that this effect is smaller in full-time
parliaments. However, the size of the offsetting effect is not precisely measured. The negative
effect of soft incompatibility is smaller than for strict incompatibility in part-time parliaments.
No effect of compensation is measured once the lagged dependent variable is taken into account.
Pension benefits, abeyance compensation and automatic promotion are all positively correlated
with the fraction of public servants in parliament. Thereby, the largest coefficient is estimated for
abeyance compensation, statistically significant at the 10% level. When public servants receive
a compensation for holding their office in abeyance, their representation in parliament is 3.3
percentage points higher on average ceteris paribus (specification III). The variable capturing
other privileges is no longer related to the fraction of public servants in parliament if the full set
of controls and the lagged dependent variable are taken into account.
In sum, the empirical findings are in line with the predicted effects for the institutional vari-
ables. In particular, the major restriction of strict incompatibility and the main privilege of
abeyance compensation are statistically systematically related to the fraction of public servants
in parliament.
V. Concluding Remarks
The separation of powers and a responsible government are major principles in a democracy that
are sustained by a set of checks and balances. However, the implementation of these principles
in a set of (formal and informal) institutions is solved differently in various democracies around
the world. This situation gives reason to comparative institutional research on government
structures that are most conducive to a political process that fulfills citizens’ preferences. So
far, most of this research has focused on the allocation of decision-making power between legal
entities (i.e. the functional separation of power). However, there is also the personal separation
of power (i.e. the idea that separate people are selected for different offices). This selection
might be (legally) strict or operate through incentives for self-selection to different offices.
In this paper, we laid out an analytical framework based on a cost-benefit calculus to explore the
selection of public servants into legislatures. This is a first step to address the determinants and
consequences of personal linkages between public administration and the legislature that emerge
because public servants pursue a political mandate. In our empirical analysis for the German
Laender based on a novel data set, we find that in many Laender and for many of the years a
substantial fraction of the parliamentary mandates was represented by members of the public
service. In fact, in 17.5% of the legislative terms more than half of the mandates went to public
servants. In 50.8% of the terms at least more than 40% of the elected politicians had a public
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service background. Moreover, we find that institutional restrictions in terms of incompatibility
rules substantially decrease the selection of public servants into Laender parliaments. On the
other hand, the privileges granted to public servants when pursuing a political career, in partic-
ular compensation for holding one’s office in abeyance, increase the fraction of public servants in
parliament. An important privilege for public servants is also that of guaranteed reemployment
after they resign from parliament or are not reelected. However, this advantage in the political
process could not be quantified as it holds throughout time and Laender. Based on our analysis,
we think that the economic approach is well suited to account for the variety of public servants in
parliaments and that it can be productively applied to other specific institutional environments.
Whether and how the institutions that affect the selection of citizens into political mandates
matter for the outcome of the political process is beyond the current study. We confine ourselves
to formulating some hypotheses, first with regard to hidden action and, second, with regard to
hidden type or selection.
The representation of public servants in parliament is expected to create a conflict of interests.
As members of parliament, they are simultaneously principals requesting public services and
agents expected to deliver them efficiently (to the population). In particular, the private inter-
ests of public servants in their position as bureaucrats might lead to slack that is less forcefully
counteracted by legislative control if pursued by committees that largely consist of public ser-
vants. This mechanism is expected to hold even if a job in public service is incompatible with a
political mandate but reemployment in the public service is guaranteed or the office is just held
in abeyance. The conflict of interest is then inter-temporal.
In contrast, the selection of public servants in the legislature could also serve as a check. If the
information asymmetry between the public administration and the legislature is severe, electing
insiders into parliament (that become accountable to the electorate) might help to align interests
between principals and agents.
Hypotheses about the consequences of the strong parliamentary representation of public ser-
vants also emerge with regard to policy choice. Best et al. (2000) provocatively characterize
their representation as “distant from the productive sectors of the economy, the risks of the
labour market, and the pressure of competition in achievement-oriented work environments”
but specialized “in redistribution rather than in the creation of wealth” (p. 173). Beside broad
policy choices, testable predictions are available for specific policies. Public servants in parlia-
ments are expected to sit in committees that deal with administrative issues (Schrode 1977:
111). This (self-) selection might be mainly attributable to expertise or professional interests. A
case in point is the engagement in the drafting and revising of public service law. This law also
includes some of the privileges that are granted to public servants when they pursue a political
career. The latter aspect also indicates the endogeneity of the institutional restrictions and
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privileges analyzed in our study. To the extent that the changes in our institutional variables
are systematically related to the representation of public servants in parliament, the observed
correlations might partly reflect reverse causation. We were unable to identify any clear ex-
ogenous events that could be enlisted as potential statistical instruments for having exclusively
affected the privileges granted to public servants.
Beside the consequences derived based on hidden action, public servants in parliament could
affect political outcomes simply by their ties to the state. The vocation of a career in public
service might reflect particular loyalty to an organization set up to provide public services. Such
a public service motivation might carry over to the behavior in a political mandate and stabilize
political bargaining in parliament. Given the reemployment guarantee of public servants, such
candidates might be considered relatively independent of outside pressure and free to dedicate
themselves to parliamentary duties until the end of their mandate.
This discussion clearly shows that in a next step the policy consequences of public servants’
representation in parliament need to be carefully explored. This is necessary in order to assess
the institutions that affect the selection of bureaucrats into parliaments and to derive meaningful
advice for constitutional choices.
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Figure 1: Fractions of public servants elected to the lower houses of the German parliament and
the Austrian parliament
Notes: For the German data, there is a change in the categorization of the socio-economic composition of
the parliament in 1994. The category members and former members of the government (10.1% in 1994)
was eliminated. These members of parliament (mostly ministers and political public servants) are now
classified according to their former occupation.
Sources: Data for Germany for the early legislative terms is from Schindler (1999), for the terms 13 to
15 from Deutsch and Schu¨ttemeyer (2003), and for the 16th term from Kintz (2006). Data for Austria is
retrieved from www.parlinkom.gv.at.
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Figure 2: Fractions of public servants elected to the Laender parliaments of North Rhine-
Westphalia, Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and Bavaria between 1946 and 2008
Sources: Official parliamentary handbook series of the Laender parliaments (see also table A.1).
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Table 1: Determinants of the Representation of Bureaucrats in German Laender Parliaments
Basic estimations for all Laender
Dependent variable: Fraction of public servants in parliament
I II III IV
Strict incompatibility –0.134*** –0.124*** –0.175*** –0.125***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.029)
Soft incompatibility 0.008 –0.102*** –0.070** –0.094***
(0.029) (0.038) (0.033) (0.031)
Strict inc. x full-time 0.195*** 0.199*** 0.146*** 0.069**
parliament (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029)
Soft inc. x full-time 0.043* 0.073* 0.036 –0.020
parliament (0.025) (0.041) (0.023) (0.037)
Pension benefit 0.099*** 0.105*** 0.022 0.026
(0.023) (0.020) (0.026) (0.023)
Abeyance compensation 0.138*** 0.130*** 0.126*** 0.044*
(0.021) (0.024) (0.019) (0.023)
Automatic promotion 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.050 0.069*
(0.042) (0.040) (0.039) (0.036)
Other privileges –0.105*** –0.082*** –0.065** –0.050**
(0.021) (0.022) (0.027) (0.024)
Laender fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Decade fixed effects No No Yes Yes
R2 0.402 0.456 0.560 0.660
N 177 177 177 177
Notes: Partial correlations from OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance
levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Sources: Data compiled based on the sources listed in tables A.1 and A.3 in the appendix.
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Table 2: Determinants of the Representation of Bureaucrats in German Laender Parliaments
Extended estimations for the old Laender
Dependent variable: Fraction of public servants in parliament
I II III
Lagged fraction 0.690*** 0.511***
of public servants (0.076) (0.084)
Strict incompatibility –0.125*** –0.119*** –0.123***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.030)
Soft incompatibility –0.094*** –0.096*** –0.096***
(0.032) (0.036) (0.033)
Strict inc. x full-time 0.069** 0.063*** 0.035
parliament (0.029) (0.022) (0.023)
Soft inc. x full-time –0.020 0.014 –0.019
parliament (0.037) (0.034) (0.034)
Pension benefit 0.026 0.051*** 0.016
(0.023) (0.016) (0.020)
Abeyance compensation 0.044* 0.063*** 0.033*
(0.023) (0.020) (0.020)
Automatic promotion 0.069* 0.044 0.021
(0.036) (0.037) (0.033)
Other privileges –0.050** –0.020 –0.006
(0.024) (0.019) (0.022)
Laender fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Decade fixed effects Yes No Yes
R2 0.677 0.791 0.829
N 156 145 145
Notes: Partial correlations from OLS regressions. Panel-corrected standard errors for estima-
tions II and III taking into account panel heteroskedasticity. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1,
** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Sources: Data compiled based on the sources listed in tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix.
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Appendix
Data on public servants in German Laender parliaments
Information on the occupational background of the members of the German Laender parliaments
is mainly collected from entries in the parliamentary handbooks. Entries for single members
were coded and summed to determine the fraction of public servants in parliament. If available,
summary statistics from parliamentary handbooks or other sources were considered. Table A.1
provides a detailed account of the sources by legislative period (LP).
Table A.1: Data sources for the fraction of public servants in German Laender parliaments
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
LP 1-6: Occupational statistics from parliamentary handbooks.
LP 7-14: Occupational statistics from parliamentary handbooks, corrected for the category
members and former members of the government based on entries for single members of
parliament.
Bavaria
LP 1-6: Occupational statistics from parliamentary handbooks.
LP 7-8: Occupational statistics from parliamentary handbooks, corrected for mayors and
district administrators.
LP 9-12: Occupational statistics from parliamentary handbooks, corrected for the category
members and former members of the government based on entries for single members of
parliament.
LP 13-15: Occupational statistics from parliamentary handbooks.
Berlin
LP 5: Nauber (1970).
LP 6-14: Own coding based on entries in the parliamentary handbooks for single members.
LP 15-16: Own coding based on the parliamentary online database containing individual
entries.
Bremen
LP 4-7: Own coding based on entries in the parliamentary handbooks for single members.
LP 8: Hess (1976).
LP 9-16: Occupational statistics from parliamentary handbooks.
LP 17: Own coding based on the parliamentary online database containing individual entries.
Hamburg
LP 7-18: parliamentary handbooks.
LP 19: own coding based on the parliamentary online database containing individual entries.
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Continuation of table A.1
Hesse
LP 1-4: Schrode (1976).
LP 5: Holl (1989).
LP 6-10: Own coding based on entries in the parliamentary handbook (Lengemann 1987) for
single members.
LP 11-16: Occupational statistics from parliamentary handbooks.
LP 17: Occupational statistics from the parliamentary online database.
Lower Saxony
LP 1-15: Occupational statistics from parliamentary handbooks.
LP 16: Occupational statistics from the parliamentary online database.
North Rhine-Westphalia
LP 2-14: Occupational statistics from parliamentary handbooks.
Rhineland-Palatinate
LP 1-3: Own coding based on entries in the parliamentary handbook (Landtag Rheinland-
Pfalz 1987) for single members.
LP 4-6: Schrode (1977).
LP 7-15: Own coding based on entries in the parliamentary handbook (Landtag Rheinland-
Pfalz 1987) for single members.
Saar
LP 1-12: Ru¨tters (2003).
LP 13: Own coding based on entries in the parliamentary handbook for single members.
Schleswig-Holstein
LP 3-9: Occupational statistics from parliamentary handbooks.
LP 10: Own coding based on entries in the parliamentary handbook for single members.
LP 11-15: Occupational statistics from parliamentary handbooks.
LP 16: Own coding based on the parliamentary online database containing individual entries.
Brandenburg
LP 1-3: Lu¨bker and Schu¨ttemeyer (2004);
LP 4: Occupational statistics from parliamentary handbooks.
Mecklenburg-Lower-Pomerania
LP 2-5: Own coding based on entries in the parliamentary handbook for single members.
Saxony
LP 1-2: Patzelt (1997).
LP 3-5: Own coding based on entries in the parliamentary handbook for single members.
Saxony-Anhalt
LP 1-5: Own coding based on entries in the parliamentary handbook for single members.
Thuringia
LP 1-4: Thu¨ringer Landtag (2005).
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for the fraction of public servants elected to German Laender
parliaments
No. of LPs Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Old Laender
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg 14 47.39 9.10 29.00 61.60
Bavaria 15 40.45 9.91 23.80 53.43
Berlin 12 39.91 6.95 25.00 48.85
Bremen 14 38.29 7.35 30.12 55.00
Hamburg 13 33.49 4.93 23.14 41.66
Hesse 17 46.56 7.91 32.50 55.45
Lower Saxony 16 29.28 12.28 10.60 42.58
North Rhine-Westphalia 13 30.24 8.88 15.34 41.50
Rhineland-Palatinate 15 45.26 12.63 24.20 60.00
Saar 13 43.22 11.25 26.00 58.00
Schleswig-Holstein 14 43.34 8.25 24.60 58.10
New Laender
Brandenburg 4 40.84 7.28 31.50 48.90
Meckl.-Lower-Pomerania 4 38.73 8.64 28.17 46.48
Saxony 4 44.45 6.48 35.48 50.80
Saxony-Anhalt 5 31.04 5.39 24.50 37.73
Thuringia 4 33.20 1.63 31.40 35.20
Sum old Laender 156 39.88 10.98 10.60 61.60
Sum new Laender 21 37.34 7.62 24.50 50.80
Sum all Laender 177 39.58 10.65 10.60 61.60
Note: LPs indicates the number of legislative periods.
Sources: See table A.1.
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Table A.3: Institutions characterizing the legal status of public servants in the German
Laender parliaments (part 1)
Strict
incompatibility
Soft
incompatibility
Pension benefit Abeyance
compensation
Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg
LP 1 (1952) as of LP 2
(1956)
LP 5-7
(1968-1980)
as of LP 2
(1956)
Bavaria as of LP 7
(1970)
never applied LP 7-8
(1970-1978)
LP 7-8
(1970-1978)
Berlin never applied never applied never applied never applied
Bremen as of LP 7
(1967)
never applied as of LP 10
(1979)
as of LP 7
(1967)
Hamburg never applied applies to all
observed
periods (as of
1970)
never applied never applied
Hesse as of LP 8
(1974)
LP 2-7
(1950-1974)
LP 7-8
(1970-1978)
LP 2-8
(1950-1978)
Lower Saxony as of LP 1
(1947)
never applied LP 7-8
(1970-1978)
LP 5-8
(1963-1978)
North Rhine-
Westphalia
applies to all
observed
periods (as of
1950)
never applied LP 6-8
(1966-1980)
LP 3-8
(1958-1980)
Rhineland-
Palatinate
as of LP 8
(1975)
LP 2-7
(1951-1971)
LP 7-8
(1971-1979)
LP 2-11
(1951-1991)
Saar LP 2-3
(1952-1959) and
as of LP 7
(1975)
LP 1 (1947) and
LP 4-6
(1960-1975)
LP 6-7
(1970-1980)
LP 2-10
(1952-1994)
Schleswig-
Holstein
LP 8 (1975) and
(re)introduction
in 2006, which
applies to
election in 2010
LP 3-7
(1954-1975) and
LP 9-16
(1979-2010)
LP 7-8
(1971-1979)
LP 4-12
(1958-1992)
Brandenburg as of LP 1
(1990)
never applied never applied never applied
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Continuation of table A.3
Mecklenburg-
Lower-
Pomerania
never applied as of LP 1
(1990)
never applied never applied
Saxony never applied as of LP 1
(1990)
never applied never applied
Saxony-Anhalt as of LP 1
(1990)
never applied never applied never applied
Thuringia as of LP 1
(1990)
never applied never applied never applied
Notes: Listed are the legislative periods (LP) for which the specific rules were in force from the beginning
of the terms.
Hesse: For the 1st legislative period (1946), we assume that there was no incompatibility rule in force
because the first law concerning incompatibility was enacted in 1948 (GVBl. p. 101). Moreover, Mall-
mann (1953) notes the tendency towards compatibility in the newly formed Laender (except the Laender
initially governed by the occupying power Great Britain (GB)).
Lower Saxony: The 1st legislative period (1947) is coded as strict incompatibility although the occupying
power (GB) introduced an ineligibility rule, enacted in the first state election law. No separate variable for
this stricter regulation is defined because it is unclear whether there was not still an implicit reemployment
guarantee.
North Rhine-Westphalia: The 2nd legislative period (beginning in 1950), we coded as strict incompatibility
although the occupying powers (GB) introduced an ineligibility rule, enacted in the first (1947) as well
as in the second state election law in 1950 (GVBl. No. 13 p. 45). As it is unclear whether there was not
still a reemployment guarantee, no separate variable is defined. The first law on the legal status of public
servants elected to parliament in 1954 (GV. NW. p. 147) imposed an incompatibility rule for all public
servants except teachers and university professors. This exception was in force until 1978. As teachers
and university professors were the only exceptions, we coded a strict incompatibility.
Rhineland-Palatinate: For two reasons, we assume that there was no incompatibility rule in force for
the 1st legislative period (1946). First, Kriegbaum (1967) refers to Article 95 of the first constitution
(1947) of Rhineland-Palatinate which declares no need for a leave of absence while exercising a political
mandate (VOBl. No. 14). Second, Eschenburg (1952) and Mallmann (1953) describe the tendency
towards compatibility in the newly formed Laender. With regard to pension benefits, the law on the
remuneration of members of parliaments, introduced in 1960, comprised some kind of an optional old-age
pension. However, a binding old-age pension scheme for members of parliament was introduced only in
1969. The variable indicating twice accounted years for pension entitlements was consequently coded as
1 beginning with the 7th legislative period in 1971.
Saar: For the 1st legislative period (1947), a soft incompatibility rule is assumed for three reasons. First,
the electoral law, introduced in 1952, comprised a soft incompatibility rule. Second, in the first state
constitution (1947), no explicit incompatibility principles were laid down. Third, the occupying power
France itself preferred some kind of soft incompatibility rule (Schmidt 1970: 188).
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Table A.3: Institutions characterizing the legal status of public servants in the German
Laender parliaments (part 2)
Full-time parliament Automatic
promotion
Other privileges
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg never applied;
introduction in 2011
never applied LP 2-7 (1956-1980)
Bavaria as of LP 9 (1978) LP 7-8 (1970-1978) LP 7-8 (1970-1978)
Berlin never applied never applied never applied
Bremen never applied LP 7-9 (1967-1979) LP 7-9 (1967-1979)
Hamburg never applied never applied LP 7-8 (1970-1978)
Hesse as of LP 9 (1978) never applied LP 2-8 (1950-1978)
Lower Saxony as of LP 9 (1978) never applied LP 5-8 (1963-1978)
North
Rhine-Westphalia
as of LP 9 (1980) never applied LP 3-8 (1954-1980)
Rhineland-Palatinate as of LP 12 (1991) never applied LP 2-8 (1951-1979)
Saar as of LP 8 (1980) never applied LP 2-7 (1952-1980)
Schleswig-Holstein as of LP 8 (1979) never applied LP 4-8 (1958-1979)
Brandenburg as of LP 1 (1990) never applied never applied
Mecklenburg-Lower-
Pomerania
as of LP 1 (1990) never applied never applied
Saxony as of LP 1 (1990) never applied never applied
Saxony-Anhalt as of LP 1 (1990) never applied never applied
Thuringia as of LP 1 (1990) never applied never applied
Notes: Listed are the legislative periods (LP) for which the specific rules were in force from the beginning
of the terms.
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Table A.4: Descriptive statistics for the prevalence of the different institutions
Mean
Strict incompatibility 51.41
Soft incompatibility 42.37
Pension benefit 14.69
Abeyance compenstion 40.11
Full-time parliament 38.98
Automatic promotion 2.82
Other privileges 27.12
Strict incompatibility x full-time parliament 29.94
Soft incompatibility x full-time parliament 9.04
Sources: See table A.3.
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LEWENTZ, Roger*
Regierungsrat a. D.
Privatanschrift:
RheinuferstraBe 74, 56341 Kamp-Bornhofen
Telefon, privat: (0 67 73) 93 47
Fax, privat: (067 73) 93 48
Dienstanschrift: WallstraBe 3, 55112 Mainz
Telefon, dienstlich: (061 31) 163700
Fax, dienstlich: (061 31) 163901
E-Mail: Roger.Lewentz@ism.rlp.de
~
SPD 7
Mandat: Oirektmandat im Wahlkreis 8,
Koblenz / lahnstein
Personliche Angaben:
Geboren am 19. Miirz 1963, verheiratet, romisch-katholisch, 4 Kinder
Ausbildung, beruflicher Werdegang:
Gymnasium St. Goarshausen,
Mittlere Reife
1980 -1991 Bundesamt fur Wehrtechnlk und Beschaffung
1991 -1996 Staatskanzlei Rheinland-Pfalz (Buro des Ministerprasidenten und
verantwortlicher Referent fur die Grof3veranstaltungen der
Landesregierung)
Politische und gesellschaftliche Funktionen:
1984 -1990 Verschiedene Funktionen bei den Jusos
(u. a. Juso-Kreisvorsitzender Rhein-Lahn)
1991 Mitkoordi~ator der Initiative "SPD links und rechts des Rheins"
1991 SPD-Vorsitzender in der Verbandsgemeinde Braubach
1992 Vorsitzender des SPD-Ortsvereins Kamp-Bornhofen
1997 -2002 Geschaftsf(jhrer des SPD-Landesverbands Rheinland-Ptalz
2000 Vorsitzender der SPD im Rhein-Lahn-Kreis
2002 -2006 Generalsekretar der SPD-Rheinland-Pfalz
2006 Vorsitzender des Parteirats der SPD Rheinland-Pfalz
1989 -1994 Mitglied des Ortsgemeinderats Kamp-Bornhofen
1989 Mitglied des Kreistags Rhein-Lahn
1994 -2006 Ortsb(jrgermeister Kamp-Bornhofen
7. Nov. 1994 Mitglied des Landtags
18. Mai 2006 Staatssekretar
Angaben gemaB Nr.1 der Verhaltensregeln fur die Mitglieder des Landtags
Rheinland-Pfalz:
Fruher ausgeubte Berufe:
Regierungsrat
Vergutete und ehrenamtliche Funktionen:
Generalsektretar der SPD Rheinland-Pfalz
* Mandat mit Wirkung vom 18. Mai 2006 niedergelegt. Nachfolger: Langner, David
Figure A.1: Example of an entry for a member of the Rhineland-Palatinate parliament in the
parliamentary handbook
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Figure A.2: Fraction of public servants elected to the Laender parliaments of Hesse, Lower
Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein and Saar
Sources: See table A.1.
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Figure A.3: Fraction of public servants elected to the parliaments of the city states Berlin,
Bremen and Hamburg
Sources: See table A.1.
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Figure A.4: Fraction of public servants elected to the parliaments of the new German Laender
Sources: See table A.1.
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